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This paper develops a model in which a continuum of consumers choose from
a continuum of locations indexed by school quality. It computes equilibria
that are sustained by a price function that matches consumers to diﬀerent
locations based on their willingness to pay for school quality. In equilibrium
each location is inhabited by a set of people with varying levels of education,
ability, intensity of preference for education, and income. The distributions of
characteristics within each location are determined by the structural elements
of the model.
The paper also develops a set of computational algorithms that solve sev-
eral complex numerical problems. These problems include the calculation of
an u m b e ro fd i ﬃcult integrals, the calculation of asymptotic approximations
to those integrals, the solution of an implicitly deﬁned diﬀerential equation
that depends on the integrals previously calculated, and the maximization of
a likelihood function that depends on the solution of the diﬀerential equation.
Finally, this paper demonstrates how the equilibrium implications of a
structural economic matching model can be used to solve two importanteconometric identiﬁcation problems. First, it is likely that regressions that
seek to estimate the eﬀects of school quality on educational outcomes produce
biased and inconsistent estimates because people choose where their children
go to school. The model in the paper solves this problem by using a consumer
location choice equation and an equilibrium pricing relation to create a valid
instrument for the school quality variable. Second, hedonic estimation prob-
lems in a single market are unidentiﬁed because the marginal price function
is unknown or collinear with the level of the product demanded. This pa-
per solves this problem by exploiting the restrictions that equilibrium in the
sorting economy imposes on the equilibrium price function. The equilibrium
price equation introduces a non-linearity into the system that is suﬃcient for
identiﬁcation.
ii1I n t r o d u c t i o n
There is large empirical literature that seeks to measure the importance of
neighborhood characteristics in the production of individual outcomes. This
literature begins with the hypothesis that many outcomes are produced not
only by an individual’s observed and unobserved background characteristics,
but also by the characteristics of the neighborhood in which a person lives.
For instance, the average education of the residents of a community along
with an individual’s own parents’ education and the individual’s own abil-
ity might determine the educational outcome of that individual. Working
with similar hypotheses researchers have sought to use regression analysis to
explain a large number of social outcomes including educational outcomes,
job market outcomes, fertility behavior, and criminal behavior. Important
surveys of the results of this research can be found in Brock and Durlauf
(2000), Haveman and Wolfe (1995), and Jencks and Mayer (1991).
For the most part, researchers have sidestepped a major issue that aﬀects
the interpretation of their empirical results. They have not dealt whole-
heartedly with the fact that people choose their location and that as a result
it is very likely that the unobservable characteristics that enter the produc-
tion functions for individual outcomes are correlated with observable neigh-
1borhood characteristics. If ability increases the productivity of neighborhood
quality in producing education, then people who know they have high ability
children will move to high quality neighborhoods. This could result in higher
mean unobserved ability in high quality neighborhoods. Alternatively, if par-
ents of low ability children perversely value education very highly, then they
will move to high quality neighborhoods, outbidding the parents of high abil-
ity kids. This could result in lower mean unobserved ability in high quality
neighborhoods. In short, when people choose where to live, there is little
that can be said about the distributions of unobservables across locations
unless one understands the sorting process.
Researchers have recognized that their empirical neighborhood eﬀects
models lack a mechanism describing neighborhood sorting, but they have not
been able to specify an economic model that describes the location choices of
heterogeneous consumers and develop the implications that such a model has
for what types of people live in each location in equilibrium. Nor have they
been able to embed such an economic equilibrium framework in an empirical
setting.
In this paper, I tackle this problem by developing a model in which a
continuum of consumers choose from a continuum of locations indexed by
2school quality. I compute equilibria that are sustained by an equilibrium
price function that separates consumers into diﬀerent locations based on
their willingness to pay for school quality. I show how sets of consumers are
sorted into locations so that in equilibrium, each location has a distribution
of people with varying levels of education, ability, intensity of preference
for education, and income. The distributions of characteristics within each
location are determined by the structural elements of the model.
An important component of the model is a set of computational algo-
rithms that solve several complex numerical problems. These problems in-
clude the calculation of a number of diﬃcult integrals, the calculation of
asymptotic approximations to those integrals, the solution of an implicitly
deﬁned diﬀerential equation that depends on the integrals previously calcu-
lated, and the maximization of a likelihood function that depends on the
solution of the diﬀerential equation. The algorithms I develop allow me to
analyze the theoretical and empirical properties of the equilibrium sorting
model. In addition, they stand on their own as one of the major contribu-
t i o n so ft h i sp a p e r .
The model bears a signiﬁcant resemblance to hedonic equilibrium models
developed by Tinbergen (1959), Sattinger (1981), Kniesner and Leeth (1995),
3Teulings (1995), Epple and Platt (1998), and Epple and Sieg (1999a,1999b).
These models also match consumers to locations and ﬁnd prices that separate
people based on their willingness to pay for locational quality. An important
aspect of all of these models except Epple and Platt (1998) and Epple and
Sieg (1999a, 1999b) is that consumers’ valuations of the locations depend
on characteristics of the locations themselves, not on characteristics of the
equilibrium sets of people at the locations. In contrast, in this paper as
in Epple and Platt and Epple and Sieg, valuations of locations depend on
the sets of people at the various locations.1 This is a fundamental trait
of interactions-based models and as such is a fundamental element of the
analysis in this paper.
This theoretical analysis produces an equilibrium pricing function and
a spatial equilibrium that displays rich patterns of sorting across locations.
This equilibrium is valuable for several reasons. First, it yields important in-
sights about the determinants of patterns of neighborhood sorting. Second,
it clariﬁes the econometric issues involved in the identiﬁcation of neighbor-
hood eﬀects and location choice. Third, it produces restrictions that can be
1Epple and Platt and Epple and Sieg develop a model with a ﬁnite number of locations.
In their papers, locational quality depends on expenditures on a public good. The level
of expenditures is determined by the set of residents at each location through a voting
mechanism.
4exploited to achieve identiﬁcation.
In addition to the pricing function, the equilibrium produces two empir-
ical equations. The ﬁrst equation is the education production function that
describes the relation between individual educational outcomes, individual
background characteristics, and locational quality. As I discussed above, its
parameters cannot be consistently estimated because locational quality is
chosen by the consumer and hence is correlated with unobserved individual
traits. The second equation is the locational choice equation describing each
consumer’s choice of location as a function of the marginal price of the lo-
cation and the consumer’s individual characteristics. This equation can be
used to create an instrument for neighborhood quality in the ﬁrst equation;
however, it must be estimated ﬁrst. This requires solving a hedonic estima-
tion problem which may not be identiﬁed because both the choice variable
and the marginal price are endogenous and may by linearly related. Thus,
it is clear that solving the neighborhood eﬀects estimation problem entails
solving two distinct econometric problems: the endogenous regressor problem
and the hedonic estimation problem.
First, consider the hedonic estimation problem. The diﬃculty lies in esti-
mating the structural parameters that describe demand for locational quality
5when that demand depends on a marginal price that varies with actual qual-
ity chosen. It is well known that when the price function is unknown and
the demand relationships are estimated using price data and an arbitrary
functional form to approximate the price function, the structural parameters
cannot be reliably estimated using single market data (see Rosen (1974),
B r o w na n dR o s e n( 1981), Bartik (1987), Epple (1987), and Kahn and Lang
(1988)). In particular, if the demand equation is assumed to be linear in
neighborhood quality and the marginal price is also assumed to be linear,
the structural demand parameters cannot be identiﬁed from estimation of
the neighborhood choice equation. In this case, the empirical equation has
two endogenous variables which are perfectly collinear. If the marginal price
function is assumed to be non-linear, this aids identiﬁcation by breaking the
collinearity. However, this identiﬁcation is arbitrary since there is no guide
as to what non-linear functional form to use.
Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim (2001) and this paper develop ways to
solve this identiﬁcation problem. They observe that methods like the one
described above, do not use all the information that is available in a hedonic
equilibrium model; economic equilibrium imposes restrictions on the hedo-
nic pricing function that generically result in identiﬁcation of the structural
6parameters of the demand relationship. Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim
show in a non-parametric setting with separable preferences that generically
the equilibrium marginal price function is not linear.2 Exploiting this non-
linearity is suﬃcient for identiﬁcation. In the parametric model developed in
this paper, this only requires the numerical solution of an ordinary diﬀeren-
tial equation (ODE). This non-linearity is not arbitrary because it is derived
from the structure of the equilibrium of the model. The distributions of con-
sumer and supplier types that generate the non-linearity can be estimated
from data.
Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim (2001) develops these ideas in the context
of a classical one-to-one matching hedonic equilibrium model. They focus
on using equilibrium restrictions to estimate the demand for diﬀerentiated
commodities. In this paper, I develop these ideas in the context of a one-to-
many matching hedonic equilibrium model with neighborhood eﬀects. As in
Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim (2001), I study how equilibrium restrictions
on the pricing function can be used to identify the parameters of the hedonic
location choice equation. Moreover, I show that this is possible even when
2That is, they show that the set of economies in which the equilibrium marginal price
function is non-linear is a countable intersection of open dense subsets of the space of
feasible economies.
7data on prices is not available.
I then extend the analysis to show how equilibrium restrictions not only
identify the hedonic demand equation, but simultaneously solve the endoge-
nous regressor problem and identify the parameters of the equation describing
the eﬀect of neighborhood characteristics on individual outcomes. This re-
sult requires the analysis of a non-linear simultaneous equations system that
depends on the solution of a diﬀerential equation. I show that the condi-
tions under which this system is not identiﬁed are not generic in the sense
that small perturbations of the structure of the model (starting from a sys-
tem that is not identiﬁed) result in systems that are identiﬁed. In section
5.5, I demonstrate the eﬃcacy of these methods by estimating the structural
parameters of a sorting economy using both synthetic and real data.
2O v e r v i e w
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 3, I describe the supply and
demand conditions of the model and set out the speciﬁce c o n o m i ce n v i r o n -
ment facing the consumer. The model is a model of locational choice in which
consumers pay more to live in locations with higher levels of school quality.
8Consumers value locations with higher quality schools because school qual-
ity is an input into their child’s educational outcome. School quality in each
location depends on the set of people living there. I assume that the average
education of the parents in a location is the relevant measure of school qual-
ity.3 The speciﬁc assumptions made are aimed toward creating the simplest
possible model that has the rich sorting equilibrium described in the previous
section and that can be used for empirical work.
After setting out the basic assumptions, I describe the equilibrium con-
cept that is used in the model, and discuss some basic facts that are true of
equilibria in many general models of this type. The equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium in which consumers treat the school quality in each location and
the price function as given, and choose their location accordingly. In equilib-
rium, the quality in each location is consistent with the quality they expect
when they make their location choice. I show that there is always a trivial
equilibrium in which every location has the same school quality and the same
price of zero. Then I show that if there are “separating” equilibria in which
3There is a great deal of controversy about what factors inﬂuence school quality (Betts
(1995), Card and Krueger (1992), Hanushek (1996), Heckman et al. (1996)). In this paper,
I remain agnostic about the results of this literature and note that the results in Table
1 show a positive correlation between average parental education at a child’s school and
the child’s subsequent schooling attainment. I seek to explain whether this correlation
indicates a causal relationship and how strong that relationship might be.
9consumers separate into locations with diﬀerent average levels of education,
these equilibria can be partitioned into unique classes of equilibria that as-
sign each consumer to a unique quality of location. These “quality” sorting
equilibria are the central objects of study throughout the remainder of the
paper.
In section 4, I analyze the simplest example of the model developed in
section 3 and characterize the properties of its equilibrium. In this example,
utility is linear in consumption, and I derive a closed-form expression for
the equilibrium price function. I also derive a closed form expression that
describes the equilibrium distributions of consumer types within each neigh-
borhood. The simplicity of these results provide a clear illustration of how
diﬀerent factors aﬀect both the equilibrium price function and the equilib-
rium patterns of sorting that are observed in the economy. These results are
easy to understand and easy to compute.
After developing these results, I analyze the empirical equations result-
ing from the linear utility model in section 4.3. These equations are linear
functions of the logarithms of the data. They clearly illustrate the primary
econometric issues involved in estimating the model. The ﬁrst issue is the
estimation of the hedonic location choice equation. The hedonic equation
10contains the logarithm of the neighborhood quality variable as well as the
logarithm of the marginal price variable. Both of these are endogenous and in
the linear utility model equilibrium both are linearly related. These problems
of endogeneity and collinearity must be addressed to estimate the hedonic
equation. The second issue is the endogeneity of the school quality variable
in the education production function. An instrument must be found for this
endogenous explanatory variable. The location choice equation can produce
a valid instrument for this variable if it can produce a predicted school quality
that is linearly independent of the other regressors in the education produc-
tion function. The location choice equation resulting from the linear utility
model fails this test.
This conclusion leads me to relax the assumptions imposed on the model.
In section 5, I study one relaxation in which utility is an exponential function
of consumption. This example has no closed form equilibrium price function
but allows for richer patterns of sorting than the simple linear example. The
equilibrium price function is the solution to a non-standard ordinary diﬀer-
ential equation whose approximate solution must be computed using simple
but specialized numerical techniques. In computing these approximations, I
develop techniques to solve several diﬃcult numerical problems.
11First, the diﬀerential equation itself depends on the ratio of two compli-
cated integrals that must be approximated quickly and accurately. Moreover,
the approximations must vary smoothly with the input parameters and with
the state variable of the diﬀerential equation. I develop an algorithm that
meets these criteria by carefully analyzing the integrand, making a change
of variable, and then using Gauss-Chebyshev integration formulas.4
Second, in some regions of the state space, the integrals entering the diﬀer-
ential equation are not computable using the integration technique outlined
above. In these regions, the values of both integrals cannot be distinguished
from zero using a ﬁnite precision computer. To compute the solution of
the diﬀerential equation in these regions, I develop asymptotic expansions
that approximate the values of these integrals and use the ratios of these
approximations to compute the solution of the diﬀerential equation.4
Third, the diﬀerential equation can have singularity points at some points
in the state space. I show that when these singularity points exist, the
equilibrium price function is not twice continuously diﬀerentiable. I develop
an algorithm that tests whether singularity points exist, and computes a
piecewise twice continuously diﬀerentiable approximation to the equilibrium
4A comprehensive text discussing these techniques and their uses in economics is Judd
(1998).
12price function when they do.
Fourth, the approximate solution of the diﬀerential equation must be
computed quickly and must be smooth enough (as a function of the param-
eters) to be used in empirical work. Finite diﬀerence approximations to the
equilibrium price function do not meet these criteria. In particular, since
the diﬀerential equation is deﬁned implicitly at each point in the state space,
ﬁnite diﬀerence methods require the solution of a non-linear equation at each
step of the integration. I develop a projection method approximation that is
many times faster.4This method approximates the solution of the ODE with
a piecewise polynomial that solves the ODE at a set of optimally chosen
points in the state space.
The result of these computations is an equilibrium price function and a
set of functions describing the distributions of education, income, preference,
and ability within each location. I trace several fundamental ways these
equilibrium functions diﬀer from the equilibrium solutions of the linear utility
model. In general, they demonstrate that the model developed in section 5
can generate much more varied patterns of sorting than can be generated by
the linear utility model. These results cannot be obtained without developing
the computational tools discussed above.
13Equipped with these computational tools, I analyze the empirical equa-
tions resulting from the exponential utility model in section 5.4. The set
of empirical equations is very similar to the set of equations resulting from
the linear utility model. Both the hedonic location choice equation and the
education production function contain the same elements as in section 4.3.
Now, however, the logarithm of the marginal price and the logarithm of the
quality variable (the two endogenous variables that enter the location choice
equation) are not collinear. I show that this non-linearity is suﬃcient to iden-
tify the parameters of the location choice equation up to scale. Moreover, I
show that this is also suﬃcient to identify the parameters of the education
production function.
In section 5.5, I examine data generated from the equilibrium model and
ﬁnd that maximum likelihood estimation recovers estimates of the structural
parameters with a high degree of precision. Very few of the estimates reject
the hypothesis that the true parameters are the values used to generate
the synthetic data. I also present preliminary empirical results analyzing
the NELS dataset. These estimates demonstrate the eﬃcacy of the methods
developed in this paper. Future work will analyze alternative functional forms
and more ﬂexible functional forms that can more accurately approximate the
14relationships observed in the data.
3M o d e l
There is a distribution of consumers in the economy each of whom chooses
a residential location based on the qualities of schools that are available in
diﬀerent locations. Each consumer is characterized by a vector of traits that
aﬀect the utility they obtain from schools of various qualities. I represent
these traits by the vector x =( l n s0,lnw0,lna,lnβ,x 5)
0 where s0 = ex1 is
parental education or schooling attainment, w0 = ex2 is parental income or
wealth, a = ex3 is the ability of the consumer’s child in school, β = ex4 is
a preference parameter that measures how much the consumer cares about
their child’s schooling relative to their own consumption, and x5 is a shock to
the child’s educational process that is realized after the parent makes their
choice of location. Throughout the paper, I will use xi to indicate the i’th
component of x and will use X = R5 to indicate the set of all consumers.
I assume that the population distribution of the consumer characteristics
is log-normal, i.e. x ∼ N (µ,Σ). The distribution of consumer types is one of
the crucial determinants of the shape of the equilibrium because it determines
15both the relative demand for diﬀerent locations in the economy as well as
the relative supply of diﬀerent types of consumers.
The consumers choose their residential neighborhoods from a continuum
of locations indexed by z ∈ R+. Each location contains an inelastic supply
density of indivisible residential houses h(z) owned by competitive landlords
who rent to the consumers at the price q(z) per unit.5 In addition, each
location is characterized by the set of residents who live there. This is deter-
mined by the measurable equilibrium assignment function F (x):X → R+
that assigns each person x t oal o c a t i o nz. The set of all residents in each
location is {x : x ∈ F −1 (z)} where F −1 (z) is the preimage of the set {z}.
These residents determine the quality of the schools in location z.I np a r t i c u -
lar, I assume that the quality of the schools in neighborhood z is determined
by the average schooling of the people living in z.L e t S (z) represent the
average schooling in location z and deﬁne S (z)=E [ex1|x ∈ F−1 (z)]. Note
that the population living in any set of locations Z ∈ B,w h e r eB is the Borel
5I assume that h(z) is a positive continuous density function and that
R
h(z)dz ≥
1. This ensures that the total supply of houses is suﬃcient to house the population of
consumers and that there are no neighborhoods that have a positive point mass of housing
supply.





where φ5 (x,µ,Σ)i st h eﬁve-dimensional normal probability density function
with mean µ and variance Σ . Further note that in equilibrium, this popula-
tion measure can have no mass points at any location since h(z)h a sn om a s s




dP (z)dz where dP (z) is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the
measure P with respect to the Borel measure on R+.
School quality is important to consumers because it interacts with family
background characteristics to produce childrens’ educational outcomes. I
assume that a child’s educational outcome, which I denote by s1 for schooling
attainment, is a function of four inputs. It is a function of the average
parental schooling attainment in the neighborhood S (z), parental schooling
attainment s0 = ex1, the child’s ability a = ex3, and the shock x5.
s1 = S (z)
η1 e
η2x1+x3+x5 (3.1)
I assume that when a parent chooses their residential location, they know
17the quality of the neighborhood S, their own education ex1, and their child’s
ability ex3. These variables aﬀect their residential decision. They do not know
the value of the variable x5. They only know the distribution from which it
is drawn. Income, w0 = ex2 and the preference parameter β = ex4 do not
directly aﬀect the educational production function but may indirectly aﬀect
educational outcomes through their aﬀect on location choice.
Given the above information, I can state the consumer’s utility maxi-
mization problem. They treat the price function q(z) and the distribution










where E (s1|z)=A0S (z)
η1 eη2x1+x3,S(z)=E [ex1|x ∈ F−1 (z)],and A0 =
E (ex5).
Utility is a function of consumption, ex2 − q (z), and the expected value
of the child’s schooling attainment, E (s1|z). The preference parameter ex4
measures the weight a parent puts on their child’s expected schooling.6
The maximization problem in (3.2) describes the utility function for one
6ex4 has two interpretations. It reﬂects parental altruism and parental perceptions
about their child’s expected return to education measured in utility units.
18consumer with a ﬁxed set of characteristics, x =( l n s0,lnw0,lna,lnβ,x 5)
0.
Its solution determines the demand correspondence for that individual con-
sumer, Z = d(x,F,q). Z is the set of locations that maximizes the utility
of the consumer with characteristics x when the distribution of consumers
across locations is described by the function F and the price schedule is q.
Using these objects, I can now deﬁne a locational equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let d(x,F,q) be the solution of (3.2) for consumer x.A
locational equilibrium of this economy is a pair of measurable functions (F,q)
such that F (x):X −→ R+,q(z):R+ −→ R+,a n d








q(z)(h(z) − dP (z))dz =0for all Z ∈ B
4. q(z) ≥ 0 for all z ∈ R+
The ﬁrst condition requires that an equilibrium assignment of consumers
to neighborhoods assigns each consumer to one of his optimal locations. The
second and third conditions require that housing demand is never larger than
housing supply and equals housing supply in every neighborhood that has a
19positive price. The fourth condition requires that landlords proﬁts are non-
negative. The equilibrium is a variation of a Nash equilibrium in that each
agent assumes that every other agent’s equilibrium choice is ﬁxed when he
chooses his own optimal action. The Nash equilibrium consistency condition
that these assumptions are correct is then imposed by condition 1)i nt h e
above deﬁnition.
The immediate question arises, under what conditions does an equilibrium
exist. A simple answer, is that a trivial equilibrium always exists. This
answer is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Let S = E [ex1] be the average education in the economy. A
locational equilibrium (F,q) exists that satisﬁes:
E [ex1 |x ∈ F −1 (z)]=S ∀z ∈ R+
q(z)=0 ∀z ∈ R+
Proof. See appendix A.
In this equilibrium every location has the same quality and the same
price. This trivial equilibrium is not very interesting. More interesting are
separating equilibria in which diﬀerent locations have diﬀerent qualities and
prices. However, when these equilibria exist, they are not unique. Many
20diﬀerent equilibrium assignments of consumers to locations are possible.
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is a locational equilibrium
if it satisﬁes:
1. For all x0 ∈ X,i fx0 ∈ F−1 (z1), S1 = E (ex1|x ∈ F−1 (z1)),a n dx0 ∈
b F−1 (z2),t h e nS1 = E
³
ex1|x ∈ b F−1 (z2)
´










x1|x ∈ b F
−1 (z2)
´
then q (z1)=b q(z2).
Proof. See appendix A.





sumers’ locations in z-space without changing their location in (S,p(S))space
is also a locational equilibrium if it maintains equilibrium in the housing sup-
ply market in every location. This type of reassignment can change the price
and quality at a particular location z but does not change the welfare of
any consumers. It amounts to a redistribution of wealth among landlords in
diﬀerent locations.
21All equilibria satisfying lemma (3.2) share two traits. They maintain the
same quality price schedule and they assign the same sets of consumers to
each neighborhood quality level . In this sense, they belong to a unique class
of equilibria described by a common price schedule that assigns a unique price
to each neighborhood quality and by a common rule assigning consumers to
diﬀerent quality neighborhoods. I call such a class of equilibria a “quality
sorting equilibrium class” or simply a “quality sorting equilibrium.”
Deﬁnition 3.2 A quality sorting equilibrium is a pair of measurable func-
tions (G,p) such that G : X → R+, p : G(X) → R+, and
1. E [ex1 |x ∈ G−1 (S)]=S, for all S ∈ G(X)
2. if G(x)=S, then S ∈ argmax
S0∈G(X)
U (w0 − p(S0),S0,x) for all x ∈ X
In the rest of this dissertation, I do not distinguish between equilibria
within a quality sorting equilibrium class since all equilibria in this class
have identical implications for consumers who are the primary subjects of this
study. Instead, I focus the analysis on quality sorting equilibria. This focus
is valid since, except in pathological examples, I can always ﬁnd a location
sorting equilibrium consistent with a given quality sorting equilibrium.
22Theorem 3.3 Let B be the Borel σ-algebra on R+. Fix a quality sorting





for all S ∈ B. If µ = µa + µd, where µa is an absolutely continuous measure
and µd is a discrete measure, then there is a locational sorting equilibrium
(F,q) that implements (G,p) such that
1. G(x)=S if and only if S (F (x)) = S for all x
2. if S = E [ex1 |x ∈ F −1 (z)], then q(z)=p(S) for all z
Proof. See appendix A.
The questions of existence and uniqueness of a separating quality sorting
equilibrium are more complicated. They depend more closely on the partic-
ular parameters of the model studied. In sections 4 and 5, I study examples
in which a separating equilibrium exists. In both these examples, utility is
an exponential function of consumption. In section 4, I examine the simpler
limiting case in which γ,t h ec o e ﬃcient of absolute risk aversion in the util-
ity function, is zero. In this limiting case, utility is linear in consumption
and there is a separating equilibrium if and only if the correlation between
23parental education and the parental willingness to pay for education is pos-
itive. In this case, people with more education are willing to pay more on
average for high quality locations. This diﬀerential willingness to pay is suf-
ﬁcient to sustain a separating equilibrium with higher quality neighborhoods
having higher average education.
In section 5, I examine the more complicated case in which γ > 0a n d
the exponential utility model does not reduce to a linear model. In this case,
no closed form analysis of the equilibrium is possible and exact conditions
necessary for the existence of a separating equilibrium are not available.
Instead, I analyze cases where conditions suﬃcient for the existence of a
separating equilibrium are satisﬁed.
4 Linear utility model
Here I develop a speciﬁc example of the general model described in section 3
and analyze its equilibrium. The equilibrium is a quality sorting equilibrium
as deﬁned in deﬁnition 3.2. In the example, I impose that γ, the coeﬃcient
of absolute risk aversion, is zero. This allows me to ﬁnd a unique closed form
solution for the quality price function and for the conditional distributions of
24consumer types. The development of this result introduces many of the ideas
that are used in the analysis of the more complicated model in section 5. I
derive the price function and related results in sections 4.1 and 4.2. Then
after analyzing the results, I examine their empirical implications in section
4.3.
4.1 Equilibrium
Finding an equilibrium requires solving the following problem.
Problem 4.1 Let G be the set of measurable functions on X and let P =
C2 (R++)
T
C0 (R+) 7 be the set of twice continuously diﬀerentiable functions.
The problem is to ﬁnd the pair (G,p) ∈ G×Pthat satisfy:
1. E [ex1 |x ∈ G−1 (S)]=S for all S ∈ G(X)










7C2 (R++) is the space of functions that are twice continuously diﬀerentiable everywhere
on the domain R++.C 0 (R+) is the space of functions that are continuous on the domain
R+.
25I solve the consumer’s maximization problem and then impose conditions
1 and 2 to ﬁnd the equilibrium. The consumer treats (G,p) as exogenous
and solves the maximization problem (4.1). F o rap a r t i c u l a rc o n s u m e rd e -
scribed by a ﬁxed vector of characteristics x, the solution to (4.1) describes






dS.8 More importantly, for each ﬁxed level of S,t h i s
same ﬁrst-order condition describes the set of people who choose to live in
each neighborhood. This set is simply the set of all people whose vector
of characteristics satisfy (4.2). Taking the logarithm of (4.2), and deﬁning








8For the moment, I assume that every consumer’s second-order condition is globally
satisﬁed. After solving the equilibrium pricing equation, I will check that this assumption
is true.
26This expression illustrates how the sorting economy matches a one dimen-
sional index of location quality, f (S), to a one dimensional index of consumer
willingness to pay (WTP), B0x. f (S) is an index that summarizes the eﬀect
of locational quality and price on marginal utility. The consumer WTP index
B0x is a random variable that measures each consumer’s marginal valuation
of locational quality. The equilibrium partitions consumers into sets indexed
by f (S) by matching higher values of f (S) to higher values of WTP.
In equilibrium, assuming a unique maximum for each consumer, con-
dition 2 in problem 4.1 implies G−1 (S)=g (S,pS). Combining this with
condition 1,t h er e q u i r e m e n tt h a tS = E [ex1 |x ∈ G−1 (S)] for all S, results
in a diﬀerential equation describing the equilibrium price:
S = E [e
x1 |x ∈ g(S,pS)] (4.4)
An equilibrium price must satisfy (4.4) for all S.
I proceed to derive an explicit representation for the right side of equation
(4.4). The deﬁnition of g(S,pS) implies that a consumer chooses location S
if f (S)=B0x. Recalling that x ∼ N (µ,Σ), the distribution of education









where θs = µ1 +( B0Σe1)(B0ΣB)
−1 (f (S) − B0µ)a n dΨ2
s = σ11 −
(B0Σe1)2
(B0ΣB) .
µ1 is the ﬁrst component of µ and σ11 is the variance of x1. In words, the
distribution of parental schooling in the population within each neighborhood
is log-normal with mean θs and variance Ψ2
s. As a result the average education
of those who live in neighborhood S is given by:
E [e
x1 |x ∈ g (S,pS)]=e
θs+0.5Ψ2
s (4.6)
This average is a function of µ, the mean characteristics in the population,
Σ, the covariance matrix of the population characteristics, η1 and η2, the
parameters of the education production function, and ﬁnally S and pS since
θS depends on S and pS through f (S). Moreover, substituting this formula





28where L0 = eµ1−L1(ln(η1A0)+Bµ)+0.5Ψ2
s and L1 =( BΣe0
1)(BΣB0)
−1 .
L0 and L1 are constants that depend on the distribution of population
characteristics. L0 determines the level of the price premium consumers pay
to live in higher quality neighborhoods. L1 is the regression coeﬃcient from
the regression of log-education on the WTP for neighborhood quality. It
determines the curvature of the price function.
Despite the fact that the price function must satisfy each person’s ﬁrst-
order condition (4.2), equilibrium consistency and the population distribu-
tion of types of people impose the restriction that the price function must
identically satisfy the ordinary diﬀerential equation (4.7). This equation de-
ﬁnes a unique family of price functions that are consistent with equilibrium.
Adding the initial condition provided by the consideration that zero quality












9The price function is convex if η1 + 1
L1 ≥ 1. The consumer second-order condition
for maximization is globally satisﬁed for every consumer as long as L1 > 0a n dη1 > 0.
These conditions are satisﬁed if people with more education pay more for school quality
on average and if the marginal product of S is positive.
29The constants in (4.8) are functions of the parameters of the popula-
tion distribution of characteristics and of the parameters of the education
production function. η1 and L1 play primary roles. They are the sole deter-
minants of the elasticity of the price premium with respect to neighborhood
quality. η1 measures the elasticity of children’s schooling attainment with
respect to school quality. L1 measures the correlation between willingness
to pay for school quality and parents’ own schooling attainment. Thus, a
sorting equilibrium maps the importance of school quality in the production
of children’s education and the degree of correlation between parental educa-
tion and willingness to pay for neighborhood quality directly into percentage
price diﬀerences across neighborhoods. When η1 is large, school quality is
highly important for educational outcomes. Large percentage price diﬀer-
ences across neighborhoods are required to segregate people into their pre-
ferred locations. Similarly, when the degree of correlation between parental
education and willingness to pay for neighborhood quality is high (so that
L1 is large), small price diﬀerentials are required to maintain the equilib-
rium segregation of people because people with similar willingness to pay are
relatively homogenous in education.
304.2 Conditional distributions of consumer types
The model also predicts the equilibrium within-neighborhood distribution
of population characteristics. Since the predictions are analagous for all
characteristics, I only discuss log-schooling and log-ability in detail. Consider
the conditional distribution of log-schooling, x1 =l n s0. After substituting
the equilibrium price function into (4.5), o n ec a ns e et h a t






where θs =l nS−0.5Ψ2
s and Ψ2
s = σ11 (1 − ρ2
1). σ11 is the population variance
of log-education. ρ1 is the correlation between log-education and WTP for
neighborhood quality.10
Ψ2
s , the conditional variance of log-education is constant across neigh-
borhoods and is smaller than the population variance. Since people sort
based on common willingness to pay and since that willingness to pay is
correlated with parental education, individual neighborhoods are more ho-
mogenous in terms of education than the population at large. How much
more homogenous depends on ρ1, the correlation between log-education and
10This formula for Ψ2
s is equivalent to that in (4.5).
31WTP. The larger is ρ1, the smaller is the within-neighborhood variance of
log-education.11








2σ11 + σ33 + σ44
Thus, ρ2
1 is large when the product of η2 and the population variance of
log-schooling (σ11) is large relative to the population variance of log-ability
(σ33) and log-preference (σ44) so that the variance of log-schooling, is the
predominant component of the variance of WTP in the population. In the
limit, as η2 or σ11 approach inﬁnity, all of the variance of WTP is due to
the variance of log-education, ρ2
1 → 1, and the within-neighborhood variance
of log-schooling approaches zero as sorting based on willingness to pay is
equivalent to sorting based on parental education.
Similar results apply to the conditional distributions of log-ability, log-
preference, and log-income. Since all of these characteristics are components
of x, their distributions conditional on A(S)+B0x =0a r ea l s on o r m a l .
11Using the National Educational Longitudinal Survey of 1988 (NELS), I ﬁnd that the
population variance of log-education is 0.035 while its within-school variance averages
0.023. This implies a value for ρ1 of 0.59.
32Recalling that x3 =l na, the conditional distribution of log-ability is:






where θa = µ3 +
√
σ33ρ3 √
σ11ρ1 (lnS − µ1 − 0.5Ψ2
s)a n dΨ2
a = σ33(1 − ρ2
3). σ33 is
the variance of log-ability and ρ3 is the correlation between log-ability and
WTP for neighborhood quality. Notice that while one might expect ρ3 to be
positive it could be positive or negative.
As with log-schooling, the correlation between log-ability and WTP de-
termines the ratio of the within-neighborhood variance of log-ability to the
population variance. The larger ρ2
3, the smaller the ratio. Also, holding other
things constant, increases in the variance of log-ability increase the correla-
tion of log-ability and WTP. This follows because these increases make log-
ability a larger and larger component of the variance of WTP. In the limit,
when log-ability and WTP are highly correlated, diﬀerences in WTP which
separate people in the housing market in essence separate them in terms of
ability.
These formulas also indicate how mean log-ability varies with neighbor-
hood quality. It varies linearly and is strictly increasing with neighborhood
33quality if ρ3 > 0a n dρ1 > 0.12 The more important ability is as a com-
ponent of the variance of, the more rapidly mean log-ability increases with







Thus, when σ33 is large or when η2σ11 is small the conditional mean of log-
ability has a large slope. Intuitively, these facts illustrate the point that when
variation in WTP is more closely related to variation in log-ability than to
variation in log-education, there will be larger diﬀerences in mean abilities
across neighborhoods than when the reverse is true.
The conditional distributions of log-preference and log-income are anal-
ogous. For each trait, the key parameter governing the elasticity of the
conditional mean with respect to locational quality is the correlation of that
trait with WTP.13
12While one might expect ρ3 > 0, it could be negative. For instance, if parents of
low ability children value children’s educational outcomes very highly then ρ3 could be
negative.
13Though income plays no direct role in sorting, to the extent that it is correlated with
the other variables, its conditional distribution is a non-trivial function of neighborhood
quality.
344.3 Empirical implications
The theoretical model from section 4 yields three empirical equations: the
education production function, (3.1), the consumer ﬁrst-order condition from
the neighborhood choice problem, (4.2), and the equilibrium neighborhood
price equation, (4.8). Since the error terms in these equations (log-ability and
log-preference) can be freely correlated with log-education and log-income,
before rewriting the system, I decompose the unobservables into components
that are correlated with log-income and log-education and components that
are uncorrelated with these observable variables. I reparameterize the unob-
s e r v a b l e sa sf o l l o w s :
x3 = α1 + α2x1 + α3x2 + ε3 (4.9)
x4 = β1 + β2x1 + β3x2 + ε4
Hence, ε3 and ε4 are the components of log-ability and log-preference that are
uncorrelated with log-education and log-income. Using these representations
35of the unobervables, the system of econometric equations is
lns1 = α1 + η1 lnS + b α2x1 + α3x2 + z1 (4.10)












where b α2 = η2 + α2, b η2 = η2 + α2 + β2, b η3 = α3 + β3,z 1 = ε3 + x5, and
z2 = ε3 + ε4.
x1 and x2 are the observable levels of log-education and log-income and
z1 and z2 are the components of the error terms that are orthogonal to the
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The parameters I would like to estimate are the education production func-
tion parameters (η1 and η2) and the parameters describing the distribution
of consumer characteristics (αi,βi,Γ)f o ri = 1,2,3. Notice immediately that
while it is possible that b α2 = η2 + α2 can be identiﬁed, η2 and α2 cannot be
36independently estimated since they do not have linearly independent eﬀects
on the outcome. A further instrument is needed to disentangle these two
eﬀects. This however, is not the primary issue raised by the location choice
demand system. I will focus the remainder of the discussion on identiﬁcation
of the remaining structural parameters.
The ﬁrst equation in the system (4.10) is the typical equation estimated
in the neighborhood eﬀects literature. It relates the child’s educational out-
come to school quality, observable parental data, and unobserved child and
family traits. Since lnS is correlated with z2, it is immediate that estimation
of this equation alone cannot identify the structural parameters unless z1
and z2 are uncorrelated; that is unless Va r(ε3)=−cov(ε3,ε4). This condi-
tion can only be met if changes in the conditional mean log-preference across
neighborhoods exactly oﬀset changes in the conditional mean log-ability. If
this condition is not met,then estimation of the education production func-
tion will produce biased parameter estimates. Moreover, the direction of the
bias is unknown since the bias depends on the covariance between lnS and
log-ability. As noted in the previous section, this covariance can be either
positive or negative.
The second and third equations in (4.10) are the hedonic demand equa-
37tion and the equilibrium price function. The classical approach to hedonic
estimation attempts to estimate these two equations by ﬁrst ﬁtting an arbi-
trary functional form to data on prices and characteristics of locations, and
then by using this ﬁtted marginal price function in a second stage estima-
tion of the hedonic demand equation in (4.10). It is immediate that this
approach cannot succeed in this economy because equilibrium requires that
lnpS is collinear with lnS.
Next consider estimation of the system. After substituting the price func-
tion into the hedonic demand equation, the system (4.10) reduces to a set of
linear simultaneous equations
lns1 = α1 + η1 lnS + b α2x1 + α3x2 + z1 (4.11)
lnS = L1b η0 + L1b η2x1 + L1b η3x2 + L1z2
where b η0 = −Bµ+µs+0.5Ψ2
s+(α1 + β1). The ﬁrst equation of the system is
not identiﬁed unless z1 and z2 are uncorrelated or α3 =0a n dβ3 6=0 .14 Even
then, the structural parameters in the second equation are not identiﬁed. In
particular, L1, which measures the population correlation between parental
14Alternatively, it can be identiﬁed in a classical manner if another instrument that
determines location choice without aﬀecting the production of education is available.
38education and WTP for school quality, cannot be separated from the b ηi
which measure the direct eﬀects of parental characteristics on location choice.
This failure of identiﬁcation is a direct result of the equilibrium collinearity
between lnpS and lnS.
Nevertheless, as is clear from (4.11), certain combinations of the param-
eters can be estimated with data on education, income, school quality, and
educational outcomes. Tables 1-5 display estimates of these combinations of
parameters obtained from an analysis of the National Educational Longitu-
dinal Survey (1988) assuming the linear utility model is the true model of
locational choice and educational production. Table 1 displays estimates of
the ﬁr s te q u a t i o ni n( 4 .11)a l o n e .I fz1 and z2 are uncorrelated, then these
estimates imply that the elasticity of children’s education with respect to
school quality is 0.328 (0.0302) and the elasticity with respect to parental
education is 0.376 (0.0189). Table 2 displays estimates of the second equation
in (4.11) alone. Education and income explain about 20% of the variation in
location choice.
Estimates of the reduced form of the system (4.11)a r ed i s p l a y e di nT a -
ble 3. Since these parameter estimates combine the eﬀects of several of the
structural parameters, the values estimated are hard to interpret. However,
39Tables 4 and 5, use these estimates to explore implications these estimates
have for values of the structural parameters. Table 4 shows the parameter
estimates that are obtained if I assume that the system is identiﬁed, i.e. if I
assume that α3 =0 . This assumption states that the partial correlation coef-
ﬁcient between income and ability is zero. If this is true, then Table 4 shows
that η1, the elasticity of children’s education with respect to school quality,
is 0.540 (0.0936) and b α2, the elasticity of children’s education with respect to
their own parent’s education (controlling for the correlation between parental
education and child’s ability), is -0.0222 (0.0172).
These results depend on the assumption that α3 =0 . Table 5 investigates
how these results depend on the value of α3. If α3 is greater than about
0.007, then the estimate of η1 is negative. Therefore, I restrict the table to
values of α3 < 0.007. The smaller is α3, the larger is η1 and the smaller is
b α2. Nearly any values of the parameters are possible. Given this model, it
is impossible to infer whether parental background characteristics or school
quality are important determinants of children’s educational outcomes. This
is empirical conﬁrmation that the equlibrium collinearity between lnpS and
lnS prevents identiﬁcation of the model.
405 A sorting economy with exponential utility
In deriving the equilibrium conditions in section 4, I showed that the two
determinants of the shape of the equilibrium pricing function are the indi-
vidual consumer demand functions (as determined by the utility function
and the educational production function) and the distribution of consumer
characteristics in the population. In the example solved, I made assump-
tions about these two factors that lead to a closed form solution. However,
small changes in the assumptions made about the utility function or the
distribution of consumer types lead to an equilibrium that does not have a
closed form solution. They also lead to an equilibrium that has more varied
patterns of sorting and pricing. These characteristics of an equilibrium of
models perturbed away from the un-identiﬁed state, lead to equilibria whose
empirical systems of equations are identiﬁed.
The simplest extension of the linear utility model that yields these results
relaxes the assumption that utility is linear in consumption. This general-
ization has three important beneﬁts. Most simply, it allows income to play a
non-trivial role in sorting. Secondly, it results in an equilibrium price func-
tion that is not a constant elasticity function of neighborhood quality. This
increases the empirical power of the model because it destroys the linearity
41that prevented the model in section 4 from identifying the parameters. Fi-
nally, this extension results in much richer patterns of sorting in the economy.
5.1 Equilibrium with exponential utility
The conceptual approach is analogous to that in section 4. As before there
is a continuum of neighborhoods indexed by quality and a continuum of
consumers indexed by x. Consumers treat prices and location qualities as
ﬁxed, and choose their optimal locations. I characterize the set of consumers
who choose to live in each location, impose a Nash equilibrium consistency
condition, and solve the ordinary diﬀerential equation that matches each
consumer to a set of consumers with the same willingness to pay for school
quality.
The problem is slightly more complex than the linear utility model for
two main reasons. First, numerical methods must be used to calculate the
average education in each location and to solve the equilibrium pricing equa-
tion. Second, I must allow for price functions that have a kink. For some
values of the parameters, a kinked price function is required to ensure that
all consumers second-order conditions are satisﬁed. Despite these complica-
tions, I am able to derive conditions characterizing equilibrium in the model,
42compute and analyze the equilibrium of the model, and use these results to
show that the system of empirical equations resulting from the equilibrium
can be used to estimate the structural parameters in the model.
The problem to be solved is the following.
Problem 5.1 Let G be the set of measurable functions on X = R5 ,l e tS be
a ﬁnite set of points in R++, and let P = C2 (R++ \S)
T
C0 (R+) be the set
of piecewise twice continuously diﬀerentiable functions on R+.N o t i n g t h a t
s0 = ex1 and w0 = ex2, the problem is to ﬁnd the pair (G,p) ∈ G×Pthat
satisfy:
1. E [ex1 |x ∈ G−1 (S)]=S for all S ∈ G(X)











The equilibrium deﬁnition must allow for piecewise twice continuously
diﬀerentiable equilibrium price functions because for some parameter values,
no twice continuously diﬀerentiable function satisﬁes the equilbrium condi-
tions. I will discuss this point more in section 5.2.
43First, I characterize the set of people who choose each location. Given





η2x1+x3+x4 =0 ( 5 . 2 )
Assuming that the second-order condition is globally satisﬁed for all con-
sumers, the set of people satisfying (5.2 )i st h es e tw h oc h o o s el o c a t i o nS.
Taking logarithms and deﬁning
f (S,p,pS)=( 1 − η1)lnS + γp +l npS − ln(A0η1) (5.3)
this set can be written
g (S,p,pS)={x|f (S,p,pS)=η2x1 + γe
x2 + x3 + x4} (5.4)
As in the previous section, this expression illustrates how the sorting
economy matches a one dimensional index of location quality, f (S,p,pS),
to a one dimensional index of consumer willingness to pay (WTP), η2x1 +
γex2+x3+x4.f(S,p,pS) is an index that summarizes the eﬀect of locational
44quality and price on marginal utility. The consumer index of WTP (the right
side of (5.4)) is a random variable that measures peoples’ willingness to pay
(WTP) for neighborhood quality. The equilibrium partitions consumers into
sets indexed by f. This index plays a crucial role throughout the subsequent
analysis. In the theoretical section, it enables me to prove several facts about
the equilibrium price function. In the empirical section, it plays the role of
the choice variable in the consumer’s reduced form locational choice equation.
Given g (S,p,pS), the set of people who choose to live in each location S,
condition 2 of problem 5.1 requires that g(S,p,pS)=G−1 (S). Combining
this with condition 1 of problem 5.1 leads to the following diﬀerential equation
characterizing equilibrium
S = E [e
x1 |x ∈ g (S,p,pS)] (5.5)
with initial condition p(0) = 0. This condition is analogous to the equilibrium
condition in the linear model. In contrast to the linear model, however, this
diﬀerential equation does not have an analytical solution. Instead, as detailed
45in appendix B, it reduces to an equation of the form
S − F (f (S,p,pS)) = 0 (5.6)
























and where q3 (f)=f − η2ξ1 − ξ3 − ξ4 − γez2.15 F (f) is the average educa-
tion of the people who choose a location with quality index f (S,p,pS). An
equivalent way to write it is
F (f)=E (e
x1 |WTP = f )
where WTP = η2x1+γex2+x3+x4. I analyze this equation and the associated
equilibrium further in the next section.
There are four non-standard and non-trivial diﬃculties involved in analyz-
ing equations (5.6) and (5.7). First, the integrals appearing in equation (5.7)
cannot be accurately computed without careful analysis. The integrands are
15The parameters in equation (5.7) and in the deﬁnition of q3 (f)a r ed e ﬁned in appendix
B.
46highly concentrated and have extremely steep peaks. I solve this problem
by developing a change of variables formula that maps the integrand into a
less concentrated integrand without steep peaks that can be accurately (and
quickly) approximated by Gauss-Chebyshev quadrature. Details are given in
appendix C.
Second, the technique described above fails when f is either very small
or very large. In both cases, numerical underﬂow is a problem; F (f) cannot
be directly evaluated because neither the numerator nor the denominator
can be distinquished from zero by a ﬁnite precision computer. I solve this
diﬃculty by deriving a Laplace type approximation for each integral and then
c o m p u t i n gt h er a t i oo ft h e s et w oa p p r o x i m a t i o n s . 16 T h er a t i oo ft h e s et w o
approximations can be computed for all f. Details of these approximations
are given in appendix D.
Third, equation (5.6) can have singularities at points where
dF(f)
df =0 .
Near such points standard ﬁnite diﬀerence algorithms fail to converge to the
solution of the diﬀerential equation. Fourth, related to the problem just
described, equation (5.6) can have multiple local solutions. These multiple
solutions make calculating an approximate global solution diﬃcult because
16See Judd (1998) chapter 15 for a recent discussion on computing Laplace
approximations.
47any successful numerical algorithm must avoid converging to a solution that
is not a global solution. For some parameter values these last two problems
do not arise since
dF(f)
df > 0 for all f. In these cases, the equilibrium price
function is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, every consumer’s second-order
condition is globally satisﬁed, and the equilibrium population density has
no mass points in quality space. In these cases the equilibrium price func-
tion can be reliably approximated with a standard numerical approximation
technique. For other parameter values, however,
dF(f)
df ≤ 0 for some values of
f. In these cases, there exists no p ∈ C2 (R++)
T
C0 (R+)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes the
diﬀerential equation for all S. I show below that in these cases, the deriva-
tive of the equilibrium price function must have at least one discontinuity
point. Moreover, positive masses of people locate at the discontinuity points.
Standard approximation techniques fail because they fail to recognize that
the true solution has a discontinuous ﬁrst derivative. I develop an algorithm
that recognizes when the true solution must have discontinuous derivative,
ﬁnds the points of discontinuity, and then approximates the equilibrium price
function piecewise using standard numerical techniques on subdomains where
the marginal price function is continuous and imposing continuity of the so-
lution at the discontinuity points.
485.2 Further analysis of the equilibrium equation in the
model with exponential utility
The equilibrium pricing equation is given in (5.6). It is not clear that a unique
solution exists. When
dF(f)
df > 0f o ra l lf, the following theorem proves that
a unique separating equilibrium exists.
Theorem 5.1 If
dF(f)
df > 0 for all f ∈ R, then there is a unique non-trivial
equilibrium pricing function p ∈ C2 (R++)
T
C0 (R+).
Proof. The proof demonstrates that the equilibrium equation is equiv-
alent to an ordinary diﬀerential equation with a unique solution. Moreover,
given this solution every consumer’s maximization problem has a unique so-
lution. See appendix A for details.
By construction F (f) is the average education of the people who have
willingness to pay measured by f. The condition
dF(f)
df > 0 requires that
groups with higher average willingness to pay have higher average education.
This guarantees that an equilibrium can be sustained in which groups with
higher average education are willing to pay more for high quality locations
than those with lower average education. The condition is similar to the
condition L1 > 0 required for sorting equilibrium in the linear model. Both
49conditions imply that on average people who are willing to pay more for
school quality have higher average levels of education. Thus, both conditions
imply that an equilibrium can be supported in which people pay more to live
in locations with higher average education.
The similarity of the two conditions can also be seen by examining
dF(f)
df >
0 for small f. Lemma D.1 in appendix D shows that when f< <0
F (f) ∼ = L0e
L1f (5.8)
where L0 and L1 are the constants deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 4 .7). When f< <0,
dF(f)
df > 0i se q u i v a l e n tt oL1 > 0.
Thus, L1 > 0 is a necessary condition for the application of theorem 5.1.
However, L1 > 0d o e sn o ti m p l yt h a t
dF(f)
df > 0f o ra l lf. In fact, there are
other examples where
dF(f)
df < 0 for some f. In these examples, theorem 5.1
does not apply. However, even in these cases, there is a separating equilibrium
if L1 > 0.
Theorem 5.2 If L1 > 0, but
dF(f)
df < 0 for some f, there is a non-trivial
equilibrium pricing function p ∈ C2 (R++ \S)
T
C0 (R+) where S is a ﬁnite
non-empty subset of R++.
50Proof. See appendix A.
When theorem 5.2 applies, the proof in appendix A demonstrates how
to construct a piecewise twice continuously diﬀerentiable price function that
satisﬁes the equilibrium conditions. The main idea is that when
dF(f)
df < 0,
there is no continuous function f (S)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes S−F (f) = 0 for all S and
satisﬁes the consumer second-order conditions for all consumers. Hence, the
equilibrium index f (S) must be discontinuous. This implies that the slope
of the price function must be discontinuous. This further implies that a mass
of people will choose to locate at the point of discontinuity in equilibrium.
5.3 Computed solutions to equilibrium pricing func-
tion
I simulate a baseline model in which
dF(f)
df > 0 for all f.17 The general shapes
of the price function and its slope are shown in ﬁgures 1 and 2 for various val-
ues of γ.T h eγ = 0 case is displayed for comparison. When γ = 0, the price
function is a constant elasticity price function. This is clearly apparent in
17In this section, I compute approximate solutions to the equilibrium pricing equation
(5.6) using ﬁnite diﬀerence approximations. Later, in the empirical section when I must
compute the solution of the equilibrium pricing equation many times, I use a projection
method to approximate the price function with a piecewise polynomial approximation.
51the logarithmic shaped curves in ﬁgures 1 and 2. When γ > 0, a qualitative
change occurs. For low levels of S, the slope of the price function is steeper
than the γ =0c a s e .A sS increases to moderate levels, it ﬂattens out, before
rising sharply for high values of S. When γ > 0 demand for the lowest quality
neighborhoods is high relative to an economy with γ =0 . People have dimin-
ishing marginal utility of consumption. Some of them substitute towards low
quality locations driving up the price of those locations relative to the γ =0
baseline price. But, since some people shift to the low quality neighbor-
hoods, this reduces the demand for the moderate quality neighborhoods. At
these moderate levels of locational quality, average income and consumption
are relatively modest and population sizes are small. Moreover, the average
marginal utility of consumption is nearly constant. However, as locational
quality increases diminishing marginal utility of consumption again becomes
an important factor for a large fraction of the population. This results in a
surge of demand leading to the sharp increase in the equilibrium prices at
high values of S.
Figures 3 and 4 show the conditional means of log-income and log-ability
when γ =0a n dw h e nγ > 0.18 For very low quality locations, all conditional
18z2 = ε3+ε4 √
ω22 , is the sum of the components of log-ability and log-preference that are
52mean functions behave very much like the γ = 0 case. For large values of
S, the conditional mean of income increases much more quickly when γ > 0.
When γ > 0, income is an important determinant of location choice. On
the other hand, while the conditional mean of z2 increases with S when S is
small, it declines with S when S is large. Thus, the unobserved component
of ability does not increase monotonically with neighborhood quality.
Figures 5 - 7 display further characteristics of equilibrium in this model.
Figure 5 shows that the variance of log-schooling initially decreases to about
95% of the baseline level before surging to 99% of the baseline level. This
behavior contrasts with the ﬂat conditional variance of log-schooling in the
γ = 0 economy. Similarly, ﬁgure 6 shows that the conditional variance of
log-income is sharply diﬀerent in the γ > 0 economy. It reaches a peak
near the mode of the quality distribution. Low and high quality locations
both have low variance of log-income while medium quality locations have
high variances of log-income. Figure 7 shows that the variance of z2 falls
dramatically from a peak in the lowest quality neighborhoods, reaches a
minimum, and then rises again in the high quality locations.
These examples illustrate some of varied ways in which the conditional
uncorrelated with education and income. See (4.9) and (5.9).
53distributions of consumer characteristics can behave in this sorting economy.
The patterns are clearly much richer than those found in equilibrium in the
linear utility model. In the next section, I show that this ﬂexibility in the
patterns of sorting and in particular in the shape of the price function is
suﬃcient for identiﬁcation.
5.4 Empirical analysis of the model with exponential
utility
As in section 4.3, the equilibrium yields three empirical equations: the edu-
cation production function, (3.1), the consumer’s ﬁrst-order condition (5.2),
and the equilibrium pricing equation (5.6). Reparameterizing the model as
in equations (4.9) and substituting f (S) into the consumer ﬁrst-order con-
dition, these equations are
















S = F (f (S),b η2,b η3,γ,
√
ω22)
54where f (S)i sd e ﬁn e di n( 5 .3),F(f)i sd e ﬁn e di n( 5 .7), ω22 is the variance
of ε3 + ε4, b η2 = η2 + α2 + β2, b η3 = α3 + β3, b α2 = η2 + α2,z 1 = ε3 + ε5, and
z2 = ε3+ε4 √
ω22 .
x1 and x2 are log-schooling and log-income. They are observable. z1 and
z2 are the unobservable error terms. By assumption z1 and z2 are joint










As in section 4.3, α2 and η2 cannot be separately identiﬁed; only the
linear combination b α2 = α2 + η2 can be identiﬁed. In this section, the
pricing equation implicitly deﬁnes the function f (S). Importantly, this index
only depends on the four parameters: b η2, b η3, γ, and ω22. Iw a n tt oi d e n t i f y
these four parameters in the hedonic location choice equation as well as the
parameters that enter the education production function.







is the piecewise continuous solution to the
pricing equation given by the third equation in the system. An immediate





















Proof. This can be checked using equations (B.11)a n d( B.10) in ap-
pendix B.
Thus, if the parameters in the location choice equation are identiﬁed,
they are only identiﬁed up to scale and the variance of the error term in the
location choice equation cannot be identiﬁed.
Consider further the remaining three parameters in the location choice
equation. Abusing notation let b η2, b η3, and γ represent the values of these pa-
rameters scaled by
√
ω22. In terms of these scaled parameters, the likelihood




















If γ =0 , the model reduces to the linear utility model in which lnpS and lnS
are collinear. In this case, I already showed in section 4.3 that the remaining
parameters are not identiﬁed; the Hessian of the likelihood equation is sin-
gular. When γ > 0 however, the model does not reduce to the linear utility
56model and the Hessian of the likelihood equation is non-singular. Hence, the
scaled hedonic location choice parameters b η2, b η3, and γ are identiﬁed. The
computational results in the next section illustrate this fact.
Next consider estimation of the education production function. Since lnS
is endogenous, I need to use the location choice equation to produce a valid
instrument for lnS. In the linear utility model, this is not possible since the
system of empirical equations is linear and both equations contain the same
set of exogenous variables. Here however, the set of equations is not linear.
lnS, the consumer’s choice of location, depends on x1 and x2 in a non-linear
way. The set of equations can be estimated either jointly or by creating an
instrument for lnS by projecting lnS on high order polynomials in x1 and
x2. By construction, this instrument is independent of z2 and is not a linear
function of x1 and x2.
Thus, the non-linearity in the econometric system induced by the equi-
librium restrictions solves both the hedonic estimation problem and the en-
dogenous regressor estimation problem. Moreover, this non-linearity is not
arbitrary but is produced by the structure of the model. Diﬀerent structures
that result in diﬀerent non-linearities of this type can be tested against the
data and can be used to derive valid inferences about the structural param-
57eters deﬁning the economy.
5.5 Empirical results
To test the identiﬁcation results from the previous section, I simulated datasets
in economies in which γ > 0, and then estimated the structural parameters
using maximum likelihood. The likelihood equation depends on the solution
to the pricing equation. In order to make this calculation computationally
feasible, I computed the solution to the pricing equation using a projection
method.19 Details of the method used are given in appendix E.
Some results are given in Tables 6-9. Tables 6 and 8 show results when I
assume that lns1, the child’s educational outcome is observed. Tables 7 and
9 show results when I assume that the data is censored so that I observe lns1
only if s1 ≤ 12. Otherwise I observe (s1 ≥ 12). These tables are included to
show how the model performs when the available data are censored.
All parameter estimates are within two standard deviations of the true
parameter values. The method successfully estimates the structural param-
eters of the model using synthetic data.
Table 10 displays preliminary results from an analysis of the National Ed-
19See Judd (1998).
58ucational Longitudinal Study. These preliminary results show that although
the method produces parameter estimates, it is likely that the speciﬁcation
used in this paper is not general enough to match the data. As seen in Table
10, the parameter estimates are implausible. The elasticity of children’s ed-
ucational attainment with respect to school quality is much too large. Two
generalizations of the speciﬁcation developed in this paper that could ac-
count for these implausible estimates are that the distribution of consumer
traits are not normally distributed or that the education production func-
tion is not a constant elasticity function. Nesheim (2002) is pursuing these
generalizations to test whether these richer speciﬁcations better match the
data.
6 Conclusion and future work
I developed a theoretical model in which heterogeneous consumers sort into
locations based on the average education of the residents in those locations.
The model provides a rich theoretical and empirical basis to analyze peoples’
location choices. I ﬁnd suﬃcient conditions for an equilibrium to exist in this
model and analyze some of the patterns that result in an equilibrium of this
59model.
I examined two versions of this model to gain an understanding of their
theoretical and empirical properties. Both of these examples shed light on the
issues that aﬀect identiﬁcation in more general hedonic estimation problems
and in neighborhood eﬀects estimation problems. In the restricted model in
which utility is linear in consumption, I ﬁnd that the model is not identiﬁed
and discuss how this identiﬁcation result is related to the hedonic estimation
literature. I estimate the model in this case and trace out the subspaces of
the parameter space that are consistent with the data. Few restrictions on
the underlying parameters result.
I nt h em o r eg e n e r a lv e r s i o n ,Iﬁnd that the model is identiﬁed. In par-
ticular, knowledge of the non-linear functional form of the equilibrium price
function is used to show that the system is identiﬁed. This result illustrates
how speciﬁcation of the structure of a hedonic economy and imposition of the
equilibrium restrictions implied by such an economy can be used to achieve
identiﬁcation of the structural parameters describing the economy. I test the
model with synthetic and real data and ﬁnd that the estimation procedure
produces reliable estimates of the underlying structural parameters.
Ongoing work in Nesheim (2002) extends this model to test two kinds of
60speciﬁcation errors. First, it tests alternate functional forms for the educa-
tion production and the utility function to see how robust the results are to
changes in the functional forms tested. Second, it tests alternate distributions
of the consumer traits to see how robust the results are to assumptions about
these distributions. All of these tests are implemented with the theoretical
and computational methods developed in this dissertation.
Other future work is needed to analyze more complicated models in which
consumers’ choice of location depends not only on a one-dimensional index of
neighborhood quality but rather on a multi-dimensional index. This work will
require further development of the methods developed in this dissertation.
61AP r o o f s
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The proof is by construction. Let µ1 and σ11 be





φ(µ1 + f,µ1,σ11)+φ(µ1 − f,µ1,σ11)
f (0) = 0
Since the right side is positive and satisﬁes a Lipschitz condition, the diﬀer-
ential equation has a unique, strictly increasing global solution. Let F (x)=
f−1 ¡¯




and let q (z)=0f o ra l lz.T h e nE [ex1 |x ∈ F−1 (z)]=
S for all z. Moreover, conditions 1,3 ,a n d4i nd e ﬁnition 3.1 are trivially sat-
isﬁed, and condition 2 is satisﬁed because h(z)=dP (z)a l m o s te v e r y w h e r e .















−1 (z)f o rs o m ez
¤ª
62and deﬁne b S analogously for b F. First, I show that S =b S. If S1 ∈ S,t h e n
by deﬁnition S1 = E [ex1|x ∈ F −1 (z1)] for some z1. Therefore, F−1 (z1) 6=
∅.L e t x1 ∈ F −1 (z1)a n dl e tz2 = b F (x1), then by assumption 1 S1 =
E
h
ex1|x ∈ b F −1 (z2)
i
and so S1 ∈ b S.N o w s u p p o s e S1 ∈ b S.B y d e ﬁnition,
S1 = E
h
ex1|x ∈ b F −1 (z1)
i
for some z1 and b F −1 (z1) 6= ∅.L e tx1 ∈ b F −1 (z1)
and suppose S1 / ∈ S.L e tz2 = F (x1), then S1 6= S2 = E [ex1|x ∈ F −1 (z2)].
But by assumption 1), this implies that S2 = E
h
ex1|x ∈ b F −1 (z1)
i
contra-
dicting the supposition that S1 = E
h






q(z)i f S = E [ex1 |x ∈ F −1 (z)]
¾




. Assumption 2 guarantees that p(S)=
b p(S)f o ra l lS ∈ S.
Finally, by assumption 1 if equilibrium (F,q) assigns a consumer x to a




also assigns the consumer to a location
with quality S1. Since (S1,p(S1)) was optimal when the consumer faced the









63is a locational equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Let S1 = {S |µd (S) > 0}. Then S1 is a
countable set and µd (S1) ≤ 1. Assuming S1 is non-empty, deﬁne z−1 =0
and for each Si ∈ S1 deﬁne zi (Si) recursively so that
zi Z
zi−1
h(z)dz = µd (Si)










Since the right side is positive and satisﬁes a Lipschitz condition, the dif-
ferential equation has a unique, strictly increasing global solution. For x ∈
G−1 (Si), let F (x)=f
−1
i (|ex1 − Si|)a n dl e tq(z)=p(Si)f o ra l lz ∈ [zi−1,z i].
Of course, if S1 is empty, the above construction is superﬂuous.
Next let dµa (S) represent the density of µa and consider
S2 = {S |dµa (S) > 0}
















































, deﬁne F (x)=g
−1







By construction, (F,q) is a locational equilibrium and satisﬁes conditions
1 a n d2g i v e ni nt h es t a t e m e n to ft h et h e o r e m .
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Lemmas D.1 and D.2 in appendix D imply
that lim
f→−∞




df > 0a n ds i n c eF ∈
C2 (R), the implicit function theorem then implies that there exists a unique
b f (S) ∈ C2 (R++) satisfying S − F (f)=0w h e r eF (f)i sd e ﬁn e di n( 5 .7)
65such that
d b f(S)
dS > 0. Furthermore, this implies that lim
S→0
b f (S)=−∞ and
lim
S→∞
b f (S)=∞. As a result, the diﬀerential equation
b f (S)=( 1 − η1)lnS + γp +l npS − ln(A0η1)
p(0) = 0
has a unique solution b p ∈ C2 (R++)
T
C0 (R+). By construction b p satisﬁes
the equilibrium condition (5.6) for all S ≥ 0. Moreover, given this price
function, every consumers’ maximization problem has a unique solution. To









where h(x)=eη2x1+x3+x4. Since b pS > 0, lim
S→0





dS > 0, the equation has a unique solution S∗ (x) for every consumer
x. In addition, marginal utility is positive for all S<S ∗ (x)a n dm a r g i n a l
utility is negative for all S<S ∗ (x).
Proof of Theorem 5.2. I will construct a discontinuous function b f (S)
that in turn deﬁnes a price function that satisﬁes the equilibrium conditions
66g i v e ni np r o b l e m5 . 1.
Since L1 > 0, lemma D.1 implies that
dF(f)
df > 0w h e nf< <0. Further-
more lemma D.2 implies that
dF(f)
df > 0w h e nf> >0. Therefore,
dF(f)
df has
a least two zeros. Assume for the moment that there are only two zeros, f1
and f2 where f1 <f 2. Then
dF(f)
df > 0f o ra l lf ∈ (−∞,f 1)
S
(f2,∞). By
the implicit function theorem, there is a unique function b f1 (S)t h a ts a t i s -
ﬁes S = F (f) for all S<F(f1). This function satisﬁes b f1 (S) <f 1 for all
S<F(f1)a n db f1 (F (f1)) = f1. Moreover,
db f1(S)
dS > 0 for all S<F(f1).
Similarly, there is a unique function b f2 (S)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes S = F (f) for
all S>F(f2). This function satisﬁes b f2 (S) >f 2 for all S>F (f2)a n d
b f2 (F (f2)) = f2.A l s o ,
d b f2
dS > 0 for all S>F(f2). Since F (f2) <F(f1), the
equation S = F (f) has multiple solutions for every S ∈ [F (f2),F(f1)] .





b f1 (S) S<S 0





where S0 ∈ [F (f2),F(f1)]. By construction, such a function satisﬁes the
pricing condition S − F (f) = 0 for all S 6= S0;w h e r eF (f) is given in
(5.7). At the point, S0, however, this pricing condition does not characterize
67the equilibrium because b f (S) jumps from b f1 (S0)t ob f2 (S0)w h e r eb f1 (S0) <
b f2 (S0). Looking back at the consumer ﬁrst-order condition (5.2), the function



















The left side of (A.2) is a continuous function of the single variable S0
deﬁn e do nt h ec o m p a c td o m a i n[ F (f2),F(f1)]. Let S1 = F (f1). For all
f ∈
³


























On the other hand, let S2 = F (f2). For all f ∈
³



























Thus, by the intermediate value theorem, there must be an S0 ∈ [S2,S 1]t h a t
exactly satisﬁes (A.2).
By construction, the function b f (S)d e ﬁned by (A.1) with discontinuity
point S0 deﬁned by (A.2) satisﬁes the conditions for an equilibrium. The





b p1 (S)i f S ≤ S0




and b p1 (S)s o l v e s
b f1 (S)=( 1 − η1)lnS + γp +l npS
p(0) = 0
69for all S ≤ S0 and b p2 (S)s o l v e s
b f2 (S)=( 1 − η1)lnS + γp +l npS
p(S0)=b p1 (S0)
for all S ≥ S0.
If
dF(f)
df h a sm o r et h a nt w oz e r o s ,t h es a m ea r g u m e n t sc a nb er e p e a t e d
possibly resulting in a larger number of discontinuity points.
B Derivation of the equilibrium ODE in the
exponential utility model
As in section 5.1,l e t
f = γp +l npS +( 1 − η1)lnS − ln(A0η1)
be an index of neighborhood quality and price. The equilibrium diﬀerential
equation is
S = E [e
x1 |g0 (f,x)=0] ( B . 1)
70where g0 (f,x)=f − η2x1 − γex2 − x3 − x4. This section derives a formula
for the right side of (B.1).










∂ (x1,x 2,x 3,x 4)



































Then, since x ∼ N (µ,Σ),zhas the probability density function
ψ(z1,z 2,z 3,z 4)=φ4 (z1,z 2,z 3,z 4 + f − η2z1 − γe
z2 − z3,ν,Ω)
71where φ4 (·,ν,Ω) is the four-dimensional normal probability density function
with mean ν and variance Ω and ν and Ω are the mean and variance of the
ﬁrst four components of the vector x.
In terms of the variable z, the right side of the diﬀerential equation (B.1)
is equivalent to
E [e
z1 |z4 =0] ( B . 2 )




ez1φ4 (z1,z 2,z 3,g,ν,Ω)dz1dz2dz3 RRR
φ3 (z1,z 2,z 3,g,ν,Ω)dz1dz2dz3
(B.3)






















(z2 − ν2),ν3 +
ω23
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ω22 ω13 − ω12ω23























Let I1 (z2) represent the inner pair of integrals in the numerator of (B.4).




























Letting T = Q−1Λ(Q0)


















































Thus, the conditional expectation in equation (B.3) reduces to the ratio




























































74q3 = f − η2ξ1 − ξ3 − ξ4 − γez2
f = γp +l npS +( 1 − η1)lnS − ln(A0η1)
ξ1 = ν1 + ω12
ω22 (z2 − ν2)
ξ3 = ν3 + ω23
ω22 (z2 − ν2)
ξ4 = ν4 + ω24
ω22 (z2 − ν2)
τ13 = η2Λ11 + Λ12 + Λ13
τ33 = η2
2Λ11 +2 η2 (Λ12 + Λ13)+Λ22 + Λ33 +2 Λ23
Thus, the diﬀerential equation (B.1) can be written as

























and where q3 (f)=f − η2ξ1 − ξ3 − ξ4 − γez2 and
f (S,p,pS)=( 1 − η1)lnS + γp +l npS − ln(A0η1)
75C Computation of the integrand
Consider integration of the integral appearing in the numerator in (5.7) and













Since the integrand resembles the kernel of a Gaussian density and since the
range of integration is doubly inﬁnite, the most obvious transformation of
variables is z2 =
√


































This transformation allows use of Gauss-Hermite integration techniques, cen-
ters the bulk of the computational eﬀort around the peak of the integrand,
and seeks to transform the integrand into a less steeply peaked integrand.
76This transformation did not perform well in practice since the integrand
often has two peaks. So I tried another transformation which performed much





+ c2 (f)w h e r ec1
and c2 are chosen conservatively so that (ν (f) − 2σ(f),ν (f)+2 σ(f)) is
mapped into (−0.5,0.5).20 This transformation ﬂattens the integrand, maps
most of the mass of the integrand into the range (−0.5,0,5) and proved

















A similar transformation applies to the denominator. With these trans-
formations equation (5.7) can be approximated quickly and accurately. More-
over, the calculated integral is a smooth function of both the parameters and
f.
20An alternative transformation is z2 = c1z3 √
1−z2
3
+ c2 where c1 > 0.
77D Laplacian approximation to F (f) when |f| →
∞











































f =( 1 − η1)lnS + γp +l npS − b η0
b η0 = 1
2ω55 +l nη1 + α1 + β1
k1 = b η3 +b η2
ω12
ω22
b η2 = η2 + α2 + β2












Throughout this section I assume that b η2 > 0a n dk1 > 0. These condi-
tions are economically plausible since they imply that both parental educa-
tion and income have a net positive eﬀect on children’s schooling.
When |f| →∞both N (f) → 0a n dD(f) → 0. Therefore, a direct
approximation of F (f) is impossible and a Laplace type approximation is
required. I develop this approximation in this section.































79k1 = b η3 +b η2
ω12
ω22
In the limit as f →− ∞ , n1 (f) approaches −∞. Moreover, the mini-
mizer of gN (f,z2) approaches −∞, gN (f,z2) is nearly quadratic near this
minimizer, and the minimizer is increasing in f.A w a y f r o m i t s m i n i m u m ,
gN (f,z2) grows at least as fast as z2
2 and so e−gN(f,z2) shrinks at least as
quickly as e−z2
2. Therefore, we can approximate the integral when f is small










2 (f) · (z2 − zN)











4 (f) · (z2 − zN)
4
where zN is the minimizer of gN (f,z2)a n dgN
i (f)i st h ei0th derivative of
gN (f,z2) with respect to z2 evaluated at zN. Using this Taylor approxima-








































































































































Formulas for the functions gN
i (f) are available from the author upon request.






























k1 = b η3 +b η2
ω12
ω22









2 (f) · (z2 − zD)











4 (f) · (z2 − zD)
4
where zD is the minimizer of gD (f,z2)a n dgD
i (f)i st h ei0th derivative of
gD (f,z2) with respect to z2 evaluated at zD. Then letting z3 = z2 − zD, an



























































































































Formulas for the functions gD
i (f) are available from the author upon request.
Using the approximations e N (f)a n de D(f), the approximation to the




































The limit of this approximation is characterized by the following two lemmas.



















































Proof. By construction F (f) can be made arbitrarily close to the func-
tion e F (f) given in equation (D.12) by choosing f small enough. Moreover,
when f →− ∞then d1 (f) →− ∞ . Analysis of (D.12) and the functions
gD
i (f)a n dgN
i (f) (formulas available upon request) shows that in the limit














































n0 = d0 + ω12




















0 (f) − gN










































Since I assume b η2 > 0a n dk1 > 0, this implies that lim
f→−∞
e F (f)=0 .
Lemma D.2 lim
f→∞




Proof. By construction lim
f→∞
F (f)=e F (f)w h e r ee F (f) is given in equa-
tion (D.12). Also, by deﬁnition of d1 (f)w h e nf →∞ ,d 1 (f) →∞ . Anal-
ysis of e F (f) and the functions gD
i (f)a n dgN
i (f) (formulas available upon













































n0 = d0 + ω12




























































































































































ω33 + d1 − τ12
´2


























τ22 + ω22 (b − τ12)
2
which when expanded becomes a fourteen term expression. Twelve of the


























89E Computing approximate solutions to f (S)
The function to be approximated f (S,θ)s o l v e s
S − F (f,θ)=0
deﬁned on the domain S ∈ R+. The equation F (f)i sd e ﬁn e di n( 5 .7). For
a slow pointwise approximation to this equation one can use any nonlinear
equation solver. However, for empirical purposes a fast smooth functional
approximation is desirable. To calculate this approximation, I approximated
f (S) by a piecewise polynomial function and used Chebyshev collocation to
calculate the coeﬃcients of the approximating polynomial.
I ﬁrst truncated the domain so that S ∈ [SL,S H]. Since the approxima-
tion is used for empirical work no values of f (S) are needed for S<S L
and S>S H. T h e nId e c o m p o s e dt h i sd o m a i ni n t os e v e r a l( t y p i c a l l y5 )s u b -
domains. I summarize the approximation for a typical subdomain. Let its
endpoints be SA and SB and let S0 be a vector whose M components are the
M zeros of the derivative of the degree M+1 Chebyshev polynomial adapted
to the interval [SA,S B]. In particular, S0 (1)=SA and S0 (M)=SB. Let
T (S0 (i)) be the vector whose row m is the degree m Chebyshev polynomial
90evaluated at the point S0 (i). Let a1 be a vector of real numbers of length m.
Deﬁne the approximation
b f (S




The coeﬃcients of the approximation are then computed by ﬁnding the vector
a1 that solves the system of m nonlinear equations
f0 = a
0








0 (i))) for i =2 ,...,m − 1
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Figure 1: Equilibrium price function
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96Figure 2: Slope of equilibrium price function
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Figure 3: Conditional mean of log-income
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97Figure 4: Conditional mean of z2
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Figure 5: Conditional variance of log-schooling
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98Figure 6: Conditional variance of log-income
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Figure 7: Conditional variance of z2
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